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INTRODUCTION

Restorative processes include a wide variety of mechanisms, such as
sentencing circles and victim-offender remediation, that can be quite valuable in bringing victims and offenders together. I Such processes provide
something that nothing else in the traditional criminal justice can provide.
Restorative processes can provide offenders with a better understanding of
the real impact of their offenses and can put a human face on their victim.
They also can give offenders an important insight into the norms they violated: during the process offenders see people they know and respect openly
expressing disapproval of the offending conduct. The potential influence of
this kind of social interaction should not be underestimated. This will be
discussed further at a later point.
Restorative processes also have a special benefit for victims. Consider
the case of an elderly woman whose house was burglarized by a neighborhood youth. 2 The emotional cost to her was devastating. She was afraid to
go out, yet afraid when she stayed in. The incident caused the woman to

* Colin S. Diver Professor of Law. University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank
Cat-Uyen Vo for her helpful research assistance.
1. See e.g. Leena Kurki, Restoratil'(' alld Commullity Justice ill the United States, 27 Crime
and Just. 235, 280-81 (2000) (explaining that sentencing circles involve victim, offender, and key
community members. that they are also open to the public, and that the agreements reached in the
circles are either recommendations for the judge or the final sentence); Ilyssa Wellikoff, Student
Author, Victim-Offl'llder Mediatioll alld Violent Crimes: Oil the Way to Justice,S Cardozo Online
1. of Connict Resolution 2 (2004) (explicating that for victim-offender mediation the victim is
able to question his or her offender and discuss how the crime affected his or her life). Other
mechanisms include conferencing, victim assistance, ex-offender assistance, restitution, and community service; see Restorative Justice Online - Introduction, http://www.restorativejustice.org/
intro/ (last updated June 22, 2005); Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the
Vices (if "Restorative Justice," 2003 Utah L. Rev. 375, 375-76.
2. See Kathy Elton & Michelle M. Roybal, Restomtion, A Compollellt of Justice, 2003 Utah
L. Rev. 43, 53 n. 57 (2003) (citing Mark S. Umbreit with Robert B. Coates & Boris Kalanj, Victim
Meets Oflender: The Impact of Restorative Justice alld Mediatioll 160 (Willow Tree Press, Inc.
1994)) (highlighting the case of an elderly woman whose home was burglarized by a neighborhood youth as one where restorative processes were used appropriately and successfully).
421

422

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:3

have a generalized fear of everything around her. As part of the offender's
reparations, the youth agreed to do some house chores for her and, by design, came to know her better, and her him. That contact let her better understand what had happened and how and, with that understanding, her
generalized fear faded.
But here is where I want to quarrel with some of the "restorative justice" advocates: victims and offenders are not the only people who have a
stake in how we deal with offenders. The adjudication of criminal wrongs is
not a private affair, which is why we treat these cases as state prosecutions
and not civil trials. There are important societal interests at stake.
Let me give just one case illustration that brings the issues into focus:
the Clotworthy case;3 a case from New Zealand about which John
Braithwaite, one of the major proponents of "restorative justice," speaks in
admiring terms.4 During a vicious robbery, Clotworthy stabbed the victim
six times, puncturing the victim's lung and diaphragm and seriously disfiguring his face. It was the disfigurement that had the most devastating effect
on the victim, for the result was sufficiently repulsive to people that it interfered with his normal social interactions. In the mediation session, it was
agreed that Clotworthy would not go to prison; instead he would work to
earn money to pay the fifteen thousand dollars needed for the surgical operation to diminish the victim's disfigurement. Braithwaite thought this a
wonderful disposition, an example of a restorative justice success. I think it
an example of what is wrong with his vision of "restorative justice." I can
understand why the victim would agree to such a disposition: he was desperate to reestablish his social relationships. And I can understand why
Clotworthy thought this was a great disposition: it was as if he was just
paying civil compensation, and not even fair compensation at that since
there was no compensation for the horrors that the victim had been put
through.
But the victim should never have been put to a choice of getting justice
or getting his life back. To take advantage of his desperate situation in order
to get him to agree to such a disposition is simply to victimize him againthis time with official institutions approving the dirty deed. The result is
appalling; to see it as a desirable disposition is even more so. But it nicely
illustrates how unfortunately indifferent restorative justice proponents can
be to the importance of doing justice not just to victims but to the rest of
society. Society has an important interest at stake here-doing justice, in
the sense that the offender receive deserved punishment for his wrongdoing-and dispositions like Clotworthy undermine that interest. Justice
3. The Queen v. Clotworthy, T.97l545 (N.Z. Dist.Ct. Apr. 24, 1998) (available at http://
www.restorativejustice.org.nz/Judgements%20Page.htm; select Sentencing Notes (accessed Sept.
15, 2006); but see infra n. 9 (reversing disposition in Clotworthy).
4. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25
Crime and Just. I, 87-88 (1999).
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would have been Clotworthy staying out of prison long enough to make the
money needed for the operation, then going to prison, or suffering some
other form of punishment.
II.

JUSTICE'S VALUE TO OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Why should we care about doing justice? Why should justice be a value?
The standard retributivist argument, of 00urse, is that doing justice-that is,
giving the offender the punishment he deserves-is a value in itself and
requires no further justification. s But more recently a new set of arguments
has been added. These arguments arise from social science research suggesting that there are utilitarian crime control arguments in favor of distributing punishment according to desert-the extent of an offender's
blameworthiness-not just the abstract notion of retributive justice as an
end in itself.
These "utility of desert" arguments might be briefly summarized this
way:6 deviating from a community's intuitions of justice inspires resistance
and subversion among participants-juries, judges, prosecutors, and offenders-when effecti ve criminal justice depends upon acquiescence and cooperation. Furthermore, some of the criminal justice system's power to control
conduct derives from its potential to stigmatize violators. For some persons
this control mechanism, which is essentially cost-free, is more powerful
than imprisonment. Yet the system's ability to stigmatize depends upon the
moral credibility it has with the community: for a conviction to trigger stigmatization, the criminal law must have earned a reputation for accurately
assessing which violations do and do not deserve moral condemnation. Liability and punishment rules that deviate from a community's shared intuitions of justice undercut a system's reputation as a moral authority.
Perhaps the greatest utility of desert comes through a more subtle but
potentially more influential form. The real power to gain compliance with
society's rules of prescribed conduct lies not in the threat of official criminal sanctions, but in the influence of the intertwined forces of social and
individual moral control. The networks of interpersonal relationships in
which people fi nd themselves, the social norms and prohibitions shared
among those relationships and transmitted through those social networks,
and the internalized representations of those norms and moral precepts control people's conduct. The law, however, is not irrelevant to these social and
personal forces. Criminal law, in particular, plays a central role in creating
and maintaining the social consensus necessary to sustain moral norms. In
5. St't' Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution in Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 150, 150 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds. 2d ed .. Hart
Publg. 1998) ("Retributivism is a very straightforward theory of punishment: we are justified in
punishing because and only because offenders deserve it.").
6. The following paragraphs summarize the arguments in Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley. The Utili,v of Desert. 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453 (1997).
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fact, in a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may be the only society-wide mechanism that transcends cultural and ethnic differences. Thus,
the criminal law's most important real-world effect may be its ability to
assist in the building, shaping, and maintaining of these norms and moral
principles. By doing so, it can contribute to and harness the complianceproducing power of interpersonal relationships and personal morality.
The criminal law also can have an effect in gaining compliance with
its commands through another mechanism. If it earns a reputation of being a
reliable statement of what the community perceives as condemnable, people
are more likely to defer to its commands as morally authoritative and as
appropriate to follow in those borderline cases where the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the actor. The importance of this role should not be underestimated; in a society that is
characterized by complex interdependencies, a society like ours, an apparently harmless action can have destructive consequences. 7 When an action
is criminalized by the legal system, one would want a citizen to "respect the
law" in such an instance, even though he or she does not immediately intuit
why that action is banned. Such deference will be facilitated if citizens are
disposed to believe that the law is an accurate guide to appropriate prudential and moral behavior.
The extent of the criminal law's effectiveness in all these respects-in
avoiding resistance to and subversion of an unjust system, in bringing the
power of stigmatization to bear, in facilitating, communicating, and maintaining societal consensus on what is and is not condemnable, and in gaining compliance in borderline cases through deference to the law's moral
7. Instances in which people may not immediately perceive the full wrongfulness of the
conduct-"grey area" cases-might include such conduct as drunk driving, domestic violence,
business disclosures, and disposal of trash and other waste. See e.g. Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody Presumptions, 25 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 403, 423 (2005)
("Abusers frequently claim that their victims have provoked their violence. In this way, batterers
present themselves as the true victims of the violence. This both minimizes the wrongfulness of
their own violence and reinforces a culture in which victims feel responsible for bringing the
violence upon themselves."); Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)Course:
Moving from White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 1061, 1072-73
(2006) (pointing to the fact that domestic violence laws were virtually non-existent thirty years
ago because domestic violence was not openly perceived as wrongful); Student Authors, A Look
Inward: Blurring the Moral Line Between the Wealthy Professional and the Typical Criminal, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 2165, 2166-77 (2006) ("[I]ntoxicated drivers choose to act ... not because they
desire to impose ... harm[ ] on others .... [T]he driver imposes the risks or harms of serious
injury or death, usually for the sake of far lesser personal benefits-the driver may have wanted
another drink at the bar to continue having fun with his friends ... [D]runk drivers want to 'party
it up' .... "); Michael P. Richman, Disclose (Publish) or Perish, Revisited: Disclosing Business
"Connections" between Bankruptcy Counsel and Other Professionals, 25 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 18,
64-65 (2006) (,,[T]here is an enormous gray area of 'connections' that lend themselves equally to
rationales for disclosure as well as nondisclosure, creating an ethical tension between the duty to
disclose and the subconscious desire to conceal (or simply ignore) information .... [T]he costs of
failing to disclose are often high because they implicate the professional's judgment and provide
litigation opportunities for disgruntled parties in interest to exploit the failure.").
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authority-is greatly dependent on the degree to which the criminal law has
gained moral credibility in the minds of the citizens it governs. Thus, the
criminal law's moral credibility is essential to effective crime control and is
enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability is perceived as "doing justice," that is, if it assigns liability and punishment in ways that the community perceives as consistent with its shared intUltlOns of justice. i\
Conversely, a distribution of liability that deviates from community perceptions of just desert undermines the system's moral credibility, and therefore
its crime control effectiveness. Thus, intentional deviations from justice by
"restorative justice" dispositions. as in cases like Clotworthy, undercut the
law's crime-control effectiveness. 9
The crime-control benefits of doing justice may help explain the recent
ascendance of desert as a principle for distributing criminal liability and
punishment. A number of sentencing guidelines have adopted desert as the
dominant criterion for sentencing. 1O Indeed, the American Law Institute,
which drafted the Model Penal Code-the foundation for criminal codes in
probably three quarters of the states II-has for the first time in forty-five
years proposed a change to the Model Code: to set the guiding purpose in
sentencing as that of doing justice-of giving offenders the punishment
they deserve. 12 Standing in a quite obvious contrast to this desert trend is
8. For documentation and discussion of shared intuitions of justice among lay persons. see
Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Intuitions of Justice, Research Paper No. 06-20 in Pub. L.
and Leg. Theory Research Paper Series, U. Pa. L. Sch. (forthcoming 2006-07) (draft available at
the Soc. Sci. Research Network Elec. Paper collection: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=887958).
9. Happily, the restorative justice disposition in Clotworthy was rejected by the court upon
review, 10 the disappointment and disapproval of the restorative justice advocates. The Queen v.
Clonmrrilr, CA 114/98 (N.z. Ct. App. June 29, 1998) (available at http://www.
rcstorativejustice.org.nzIJ udgements%20Page.htm: select New Zealand Court of Appeal).
10. See e.g. David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 28
Crime and Just. 71. 71-72 CWOI) ('"[Washington's] Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 rejected
many core tenets of indeterminate sentencing, putting into place a sentencing system based on
principles of just desert and accountability."): Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishmelll, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
13 J 3, 1356 (2000) ("California endorsed retribution as 'the' purpose for its punishment in 1977
and Pennsylvania identified it as the 'primary' purpose in 1982 .... "); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Courr Meets the Principle of Offense, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 821, 874 (1988) ("Minnesota's sentencing guidelines for adult offenders ... [are] expressly designed to achieve 'just deserts' .... ");
cf Michael Tonry, U.S. Sentencing SYSTems Fragmenting, Table 1.1 in Penal R<'.form in Ol'ercrOlI-'ded Times 21, 28 (Michael Tonry ed., Oxford U. Press 20(1) (showing that desert is a highly
expressed value in comprehensive structured sentencing jurisdictions such as Minnesota and
Washington).
11. See ALI, Annual Rpt. 61, app. Stutus of SubstantiVl' Penal La\\' Revision, 20-21 (1984)
(listing the states that have replaced their criminal codes since the promulgation ot the Model
Penal Code), The Code also is an influential source of authority even in those states without
modem criminal codes, where courts regularly cite and follow its provisions.
12. See ALL Model Penal Code: SenTencillg, Report 28, 41 (ALI ApI', 11,2(03) (available at
http://www.ali.org;selectALIProjectsOnline.selecTModeIPellaICode:SenTl.ncing. RepOrT
(April I I, 20(3)) ClBJroad suppon has been voiced for the theory of limiting retributivism as the
philosophical cornerstone of sentencing decisions under the revised Model Penal Code.").
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the "restorative justice" movement, at least that portion of it advanced by
academics like John Braithwaite, who use it in their anti-desert campaign.

III.

JUSTICE AND RESTORATIVE MEASURES CAN COEXIST

For these academics, it may be the potential of restorative processes to
undermine deserved punishment that makes them attractive. 13 I see their
anti-desert attitude as being both odd and unfortunate. It is odd because
there is nothing in the use of restorative processes themselves that is necessarily in conflict with desert. On the contrary, we have every reason to
believe that persons participating in the restorative process have shared intuitions of justice that shape punishment determination. As social science
research has confirmed, the criterion that drives people when assessing appropriate punishment is desert-an offender's blameworthiness. 14 Thus,
when members of a sentencing circle are sorting out an appropriate disposition for a case, what is driving their thinking is in large measure their intuitions of justice, in other words, desert. Studies suggest that these intuitions
are quite strongly held and widely shared. IS It seems quite odd, then, that
"restorative justice" proponents approve of restorative processes that commonly run on the participants' shared intuitions of justice, yet at the same
time claim that desert is to be opposed as a basis for assessing punishment.
Nor is desert as a distributive principle inconsistent with the common
use of non-incarcerative sanctions that are encouraged in restorative
processes. Distributing punishment consistent with the degree of an offender's blameworthiness can be done through punishment in any form.
13. See John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1727, 1746 (1999) (classifying restorative justice as competing with
punitive justice); Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson, Introduction: Towards Restorative Justice, in
Criminal Justice, Restitution, and Reconciliation 1-2 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., Crim.
Just. Press 1990) ("The central notion [of restorative justice] is to reject traditional justifications.
both retributive and utilitarian ... and to suggest instead that the purpose of state intervention in
criminal matters should be to bring about peace among the participants and to restore losses.");
Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice 209-10 (Herald Press 1990)
("If there is room for punishment in a restorative approach, its place would not be central."); see
also Steven P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1801, 1843-44 CPut bluntly,
restorativists really don't much care for punishment. ... Missing from [their] agenda ... is the
idea of punishment as moral condemnation.").
14. See e.g. Kevin Carl smith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish?
Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 284,
296-97 (2002) (available at http://ssrn.comJabstract=678981) (accessed Sept. 15,2006) (concluding that lay persons are highly sensitive to factors uniquely associated with just desert principles
and that their individual sentencing decisions are exclusively driven by just desert concerns); John
M. Darley, Kevin Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, Incapacitation alld Just Deserts as Motivesfor
Punishment, 24 L. & Hum. Behav. 659, 676-79 (2000) (available at http://ssrn.comJabstract=678963) (accessed Sept. 15, 2006) (deducing that just desert was the primary sentencing
motive since research participants increased punishment as the seriousness of the offense increased and did not alter punishment based upon variations in the likelihood of committing future
offenses).
15. Robinson & Kurzban, supra n. 8.
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Prison is one possibility, but there are many other possibilities, including
the full range of punishments that might be agreed upon during the restorative process. All that desert demands is that the sum of all punishment add
up to a total that matches the amount of punishment that the offender deserves according to the degree of his blameworthiness. In a penal code I just
helped draft under the sponsorship of the United Nations Development Program, the sentencing guidelines have a punishment method equivalency table that encourages sentencing judges to use non-incarcerative sanctions by
letting them "translate" a prison term under the guidelines into a non-incarcerative sentence using the conversion table. 16 So, for example, a prison
term of X amount might be "converted" into a fine of Y amount or Z hours
of community service, and so forth. The goal is to provide as much flexibility as possible in the selection of sentencing method, while at the same time
ensuring that offenders get the amount of punishment they deserve: no
more, no less.
So, if there is nothing in restorative processes that is inconsistent with
desert, why is it that Braithwaite and other "restorative justice" proponents
are so opposed to desert? 1 think it is in part a misunderstanding of modern
notions of desert. These desert opponents may assume that desert means
harsh punishment. Certainly the biblical phrase, "an eye for an eye," which
they regularly repeat, 17 has the connotation of harsh, if not barbaric, punishment. And it is true that politicians sometimes talk about "desert" as if it
means being more harsh. But no modern desert theorists would intend this
meaning of desert when they propose using it as a principle for the distribution of criminal liability and punishment. On the contrary, to be "harsh" is
to suggest that a person get more punishment than he deserves, which
clearly would violate the principle of desert.
Indeed, desert typically has little interest in assuring punishment of any
particular severity; more important to it is the proper ordinal ranking of
cases along the continuum of punishment according to the relative degree of
blameworthiness of the offenders. Different societies take different views
about what should be the endpoint of the punishment continuum: some set
it at the death penalty, some at life imprisonment, some at twenty years,
some lower still. What desert says is that once that endpoint on the continuum of punishment is marked, offenders should be set on that continuum
according to the relative degree of their blameworthiness. Thus, the amount
16. Paul H. Robinson with the U. of Pa. L. Sch. Crim. L. Research Group, Final Report of
the Maldives Penal Law & Sentencing Codification Project, vol. 1, 129-30, 138-40 (2006) (available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/draftislamicpenalcode/; select Volume 1).
17. See e.g. Andrew 1. Hosmanek, Cutting the Cord: Ho'oponopono and Hawaiian Restorative Justice ill the Criminal Law Context, 5 Pepp. Dispute Res. L. J, 359, 370 (2004) (insisting that
retribution focuses on the "eye for an eye" model where society has the "right or obligation" to
injure the offender to the same degree the offender has injured society); Christopher Slobogin, The
Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 121, 147 (2005) (characterizing retributive
punishment as punishment that adopts the biblical "eye for an eye" philosophy).
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of punishment that an offender deserves is not a product of some magical
connection between that offense and that amount of punishment. Rather, it
is simply the amount of punishment that is needed to put that offender in his
appropriate rank-order with other offenders. Modem desert is about giving
each offender his or her appropriate amount of punishment in relation to
other offenders. So you can see how odd it is when restorative justice antidesert supporters base their anti-desert campaign on a complaint that deserved punishment would be harsh.
IV.

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROPONENTS LIMIT THEIR MOVEMENT WHEN
THEY ADOPT AN "ANTI-DESERT" ApPROACH

I said that I thought the anti-desert agenda of the "restorative justice"
proponents was both odd and unfortunate. It is odd because it fails to appreciate that the central concern of desert is punishment according to the relative blameworthiness of offenders and that desert is absolutely opposed to
harsh punishment (or perhaps the claim that desert means harsh punishment
is merely a false straw-man knowingly used by the anti-desert proponents to
disparage desert). And it is odd because it is the shared intuitions of desert
that are at work in many, if not most, restorative processes-the same restorative processes of which the "restorative justice" proponents claim to
approve. Let me speak now to why I think the anti-desert agenda is unfortunate-unfortunate for the future of restorative processes.
The opposition to desert is unfortunate because it inevitably produces
both political and public resistance. That is, the anti-desert stance unnecessarily gives restorative processes a bad name-many come to associate
them with a failure of justice-which in tum translates into political opposition. Despite all the wonderful things that restorative processes can do, today they typically remain limited to use in juvenile and minor offense
cases. IS But there is evidence to suggest that their greatest benefits may in
fact be found in their use in the more serious cases,19 where there is more at
stake for both victims and offenders. But it seems clear that a broader use of
restorative processes in these serious cases will not occur so long as they
18. See Kurld, supra n. 1, at 240 (,,[RJestorative justice initiatives in the United States are
typicalJy used as diversion programs for juveniles in minor, nonviolent, and nonsexual crimes.");
Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of "Restorative Justice," 2003
Utah L. Rev. 375, 384-85 (reviewing the scope of present programs using restorative processes);
Lode Walgrave, Restoration in Youth Justice, 31 Crime and Just. 543, 567-75 (2004) ("Several
Australian states have incorporated conferencing in their juvenile justice legislation, but always as
a diversionary program, leaving more serious youth crime to the traditional proceedings . . . .
Statutory language often mentions seriousness thresholds and excludes severe offenses from restorative dispositions.").
19. See Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 15,40 (citing Lawrence W. Sherman et aI., Recidivism Patterns in
the Canberra Reintegrative Shaming Experiments, 12 & figs. 1-2,7-10 & 14-15 (2000) http://
www.aic.gov.auIRTSElrecidivismlreport.pdf) (mentioning recent studies which indicate that restorative justice is more effective in reducing violent crime than property crime).
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are trapped by the anti-desert agenda set by the academic proponents of
"restorlHive justice:'

v.

RESOLVING THE CONFLICT

My own view is that we ought to be using restorative processes for a wide
range of cases, including serious cases, whenever we think such processes
can be beneficial. And we ought to provide a wide range of sanctioning
methods to decision makers in the restorative process. Every situation is
different and each merits its own unique disposition. It may be that some
attention needs to be paid to increasing the uniformity of the total amount of
punishment among cases of similar overall blameworthiness. Indeed, there
are mechanisms available to help achieve this, such as sentencing method
equivalency tables and sentencing benchmarks, or provisions that inform
decision makers about how other cases of similar blameworthiness have
been resolved.
But so long as restorative processes are sold as "restorative justice,"
with the agenda of undermining justice rather than achieving it for all parties, it seems clear that we will never see their broader use.

